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956 F.2d 383
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Terry COLLINS, Plaintiff,
v.
PROMARK PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
United States of America, ThirdParty Defendant-Appellant.
No. 285, Docket 91-6145. | Argued
Oct. 11, 1991. | Decided Feb. 3, 1992.
Government employee brought action against manufacturer
of stump grinder to recover for injuries sustained by using
grinder on portion of Ellis Island that was west of boundary
between New York and New Jersey. Manufacturer brought
third-party claim against government. Government moved
for summary judgment. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Whitman Knapp,
Senior District Judge, 763 F.Supp. 1204, denied motion. On
reargument, the District Court, 763 F.Supp. 1206, adhered
to its decision. Government appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Miner, Circuit Judge, held that New York law, not New Jersey
law, applied and permitted tort action against government.

413k74 In General
413 Workers' Compensation
413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or
Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses
413XX(B) Action by Third Person Against
Employer
413XX(B)1 In General
413k2142 In General

Under 1833 compact between New York and
New Jersey which provided that New York
would retain its present jurisdiction over Ellis
Island, New York law, not New Jersey law,
applied to portion of Ellis Island that was
under water at time of interstate compact setting
boundary between the states and, thus, New
York law that workers' compensation was not
sole liability of employer for work-related injury
permitted third-party claim against United States
by company that was sued for personal injuries
sustained by government employee who was
injured while working on Ellis Island. Act Dec.
2, 1991, 105 Stat. 1226; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1292(b),
1346(b).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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Sarah H. Thomas, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Otto
G. Obermaier, U.S. Atty., Marla Alhadeff, Asst. U.S. Atty.),
for third-party defendant-appellant.
Richard A. Tanner, Cedar Grove, N.J., for defendant-thirdparty plaintiff-appellee.
Robert J. Del Tufo, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, Edward J.
Dauber, Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Andersen, Dept. of Law
& Public Safety, Div. of Law, Richard J. Hughes, Trenton,
N.J., for amicus curiae-State of N.J.
John W. McConnell, Asst. Atty. Gen. of New York, Dept. of
Law, State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y., Peter H. Schiff, Deputy
Sol. Gen., State Atty. General's Office, Albany, N.Y., for
amicus curiae-State of N.Y.
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Before MINER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges, and
McKENNA, District Judge. *
*

Hon. Lawrence M. McKenna, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.

Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Third-party defendant-appellant, United States of America
(“the government”) appeals *384 by permission from an
order entered in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Knapp, J.) denying its
motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party
claim of third-party plaintiff-appellee Promark Products,
Inc. (“Promark”). The action was commenced by plaintiff
Terry Collins to recover for personal injuries he sustained in
the use of an allegedly defective product manufactured by
Promark. The accident occurred at Ellis Island, where Collins
was employed by the government. Promark impleaded
the government in the action, asserting various claims of
negligence in its third-party complaint.
In the motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the
third-party complaint, the government contended that a thirdparty action was not permissible under applicable New Jersey
law. Promark argued that New York law, allowing a thirdparty action to proceed under the circumstances revealed
here, must be applied. The issue before the district court was
whether the place where the accident occurred, a previously
submerged portion of Ellis Island, is subject to the jurisdiction
of the State of New York or the State of New Jersey for
the purpose of applying relevant tort law. The district court,
interpreting the provisions of a Compact ratified by the
legislatures of the two states and approved by Congress in
1834, decided that New York law is applicable. We agree, but
on a slightly different analysis.

BACKGROUND
Ellis Island in the bay of New York is best known as the
gateway through which millions of immigrants entered the
United States at the turn of the century. It is estimated

that the ancestors of 40% of all Americans came through
Ellis Island, which has been described as “a shrine to the
nation's immigrant history and ethnic diversity.” Robert
Hanley, Ellis Is. Demolition Debate: What Is Not Worth
Saving? N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1991, at B7. Buildings used
by the Immigration Service to process the new arrivals have
been restored through private donations and public funds
and evoke memories of those who left their native lands
to become permanent parts of the American mosaic. Id.
Now administered by the National Park Service, Ellis Island
continues to remind us of the hope that has drawn (and
continues to draw) people to our shores from throughout the
world and of the responsibility of each American to keep that
hope alive.
It appears that the place now known as Ellis Island was
included in the grant of the territory known as New
Netherlands transferred by Charles II, King of England, to
the Duke of York on March 12, 1664. Title to the Island
subsequently was granted to Captain William Dyre by the
colonial governor of New York and devolved through various
mesne conveyances to Samuel Ellis and his heirs. The
transfers of title were recorded in accordance with New York
law in the Register of New York County. The Island was
part of New York State and New York County in the late
18th Century and was subject to taxation by the City of
New York. Commencing in 1795, the State of New York
appropriated and expended substantial sums of money to
construct military fortifications on Ellis Island and occupied
it with military staff. On March 18, 1808, the New York
legislature authorized the cession of Ellis Island to the federal
government for fortification purposes. Ultimately, Governor
Tompkins of New York, following acquisition of the Island
by condemnation, executed and delivered a deed, dated June
30, 1808, conveying to the United States all of the right, title
and interest of the State of New York in and to the Island.
Following a dispute between the states of New York and
New Jersey, commissioners representing both states in 1833
entered into a Compact to define the jurisdictional and
territorial limits of each state in the New York harbor. The
Compact was ratified by the New York and New Jersey
legislatures and was approved by Congress on June 28,
1834. Article I of the Compact established the boundary line
between the states at a point in the middle of the Hudson
River and New York Bay, with New Jersey to the west,
and New York to the east, of the line. Article II provided
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that *385 “[t]he state of New York shall retain its present
jurisdiction of and over ... Ellis' island [ ], and shall also retain
exclusive jurisdiction of and over the other islands lying in
the waters above-mentioned, and now under the jurisdiction
of that state.” Article III of the Compact provided as follows:
The state of New York shall have and enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction of and over all the waters of the bay of New York,
and of and over all the waters of Hudson river, lying west of
Manhattan island, and to the south of the mouth of Spuyten
Duyvel creek, and of and over the lands covered by the said
waters to the low-water mark on the westerly or New Jersey
side thereof, subject to the following rights of property and
jurisdiction of the state of New Jersey, that is to say:
1. The state of New Jersey shall have the exclusive right of
property in and to the land under water, lying west of the
middle of the bay of New York and west of the middle of that
part of the Hudson river which lies between Manhattan island
and New Jersey.
2. The state of New Jersey shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction of and over the wharves, docks and improvements
made and to be made on the shore of the said state, and of
and over all vessels aground on said shore, or fastened to
any such wharf or dock, except that the said vessels shall be
subject to the quarantine or health laws, and laws in relation
to passengers of the state of New York, which now exist or
which may hereafter be passed.
3. The state of New Jersey shall have the exclusive right of
regulating the fisheries on the westerly side of the middle
of the said waters; provided, that the navigation be not
obstructed or hindered.

After the Civil War, the War Department determined that a
military installation no longer was required at Ellis Island.
In 1890, it transferred the Island to the Treasury Department
for use as an immigration station. 1 In order to enlarge the
Island for that use, the government undertook several landfill
projects between the years 1890 and 1934. As a result, the size
of Ellis Island ultimately was increased from approximately
three acres to approximately 27.5 acres. Plaintiff Collins was
injured in an accident that occurred on a portion of the Island
created by landfill. There is no question that the locus in quo
lies on the west, or New Jersey, side of the boundary line

between New York and New Jersey established by the 1833
Compact. All of Ellis Island lies on the west side of the line.
1

The immigration station opened on January 1, 1892,
admitting 700 immigrants on its first day of operations.
17,000,000 immigrants were admitted through Ellis
Island between 1892 and 1954. By Joint Resolution,
Congress designated the centennial of the opening of the
immigration station, January 1, 1992, as “National Ellis
Island Day,” noting that Ellis Island was reopened in the
fall of 1990 as a historic site representing “the largest
historic renovation project in the history of the United
States.” See Pub.L. No. 102-177, 105 Stat. 1226 (1991).

On April 29, 1986, when the accident occurred, Mr.
Collins was engaged in the performance of his duties as
a maintenance laborer employed by the government at
Ellis Island. He was operating a stump grinding machine
manufactured by Promark and was struck in the foot by a
revolving blade of the machine. The resulting injuries were
so severe as to require a below the knee leg amputation. The
place of the accident was a location known as the “Festival
Lawn,” a previously submerged area created by landfilling
between 1920 and 1922.
Plaintiff Collins filed this action against Promark to recover
damages for the personal injuries he sustained in the accident.
His complaint pleads claims sounding in negligence, breach
of warranty and strict liability in tort. Promark has impleaded
the government in a third-party action, alleging failure to
provide a safe workplace; failure to provide safety apparel
and appliances; negligent lack of training in the use of power
equipment; and negligent supervision of Mr. Collins and
those who were his immediate supervisors. Promark seeks
contribution from the government for any sums adjudged to
be due the plaintiff in the underlying action.
The denial of the government's motion for summary judgment
dismissing the *386 third-party complaint gives rise to this
appeal. The motion was based on the government's contention
that the third-party action is barred by the New Jersey
Workers Compensation Law, which limits an employer's
liability for work-related accidents to benefits provided as
a consequence of statutory requirements for the payment of
compensation to injured workers. See Ramos v. BrowningFerris Industries, 103 N.J. 177, 184, 510 A.2d 1152, 1155
(1986); Welch v. Schneider National Bulk Carriers, 676
F.Supp. 571, 579 (D.N.J.1987). The government has been
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paying such benefits to Mr. Collins in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. Promark opposed the motion for
summary judgment with the argument that the Workers
Compensation Law of New York is no bar to third-party
actions in cases such as this. See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
The dispositive issue on the motion, therefore, was whether
the laws of New Jersey or the laws of New York are to be
applied in this case. The district court examined the 1833
Compact and decided that New York law governs.
In an Opinion and Order dated April 8, 1991, 763 F.Supp.
1204 (S.D.N.Y.1991), the district court found that the place of
the accident was “within the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of New
York as provided by the third article” of the Compact, and that
New York's jurisdiction “is not defeated by the fact that New
Jersey has property rights to the underwater lands upon which
the areas in question were built.” Id. at 1206. The government
sought reconsideration of the district court's determination,
arguing that the Compact gives New Jersey more than mere
ownership of the previously submerged lands. The court upon
reconsideration reviewed additional authorities submitted by
the government but adhered to its original decision in an
Opinion and Order dated April 12, 1991, 763 F.Supp. 1206
(S.D.N.Y.1991). Referring to the jurisdiction conferred upon
New York for the exercise of police powers over the waters
on the New Jersey side of the boundary line between the
two states, the district court observed that “a state's power to
impose criminal penalties on an individual would include the
less intrusive power to have that individual's tortious conduct
governed by the same state's law.” Id. at 1208. The district
court certified its orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and
we granted permission to file this appeal.

DISCUSSION
The Federal Tort Claims Act, upon which the third-party
action is grounded, permits suits against the government for
the negligence of government employees acting within the
scope of their employment “under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see Akutowicz
v. United States, 859 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir.1988). We

agree with the district court that the third-party action may go
forward in accordance with the law of New York, which is
the law of the place where the accident occurred and which
permits actions for contribution against employers under
circumstances such as those revealed here. The principal basis
for our decision is Article II of the Compact, which clearly
provides that “[t]he state of New York shall retain its present
jurisdiction of and over ... Ellis' island[ ].”
While the government contends that “present jurisdiction”
refers to the 3-acre version of Ellis Island as it stood in
1833 and not to the 27.5-acre version as it stands today after
years of landfilling, the basis for this contention is not clear.
The language of the Compact concerns power over the entity
known as Ellis Island and in no way implicates the size of
the entity. It was the stated intention of the Commissioners
that whatever matters were subject to the jurisdiction of
New York at the time the Compact was entered into would
continue thereafter to be subject to the jurisdiction of New
York. Surely, the Commissioners must have contemplated
that the territory of the Island might over the years decrease
or increase as the result of natural or artificial forces. This is
evidenced by the fact that language of size forms no *387
part of the structure of the Compact as it specifically relates
to Ellis Island.
The great Holmes made passing reference to the “present
jurisdiction” language in the course of his opinion for the
Supreme Court in Central Railroad v. Jersey City, 209 U.S.
473, 28 S.Ct. 592, 52 L.Ed. 896 (1908). That case did not
involve a question of jurisdiction over Ellis Island but did
present the question of the power of the State of New Jersey
to tax lands lying under New York Bay on the New Jersey
side of the boundary line established between the two states.
It was clear in that case that New Jersey had the authority to
tax the underwater lands in consequence of its exclusive right
of property in the submerged area, a right which the Court
said was “to be taken primarily to refer to ultimate sovereign
rights, in pursuance of the settlement of the territorial limits.”
Id. at 478, 28 S.Ct. at 593. However, Justice Holmes went on
to say that
the often-expressed purpose of the
appointment of the commissioner[s]
and of the agreement to settle the
territorial limits and jurisdiction must
mean, by territorial limits, sovereignty,
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and by jurisdiction something less. It is
suggested that jurisdiction is used in a
broader sense in the second article, and
that may be true so far as concerns ...
Ellis island[ ]. But the provision there is
that New York shall retain its “present”
jurisdiction over [Ellis Island], and
would seem on its face simply to be
intended to preserve the status quo ante,
whatever it may be.

Id. at 479, 28 S.Ct. at 593.
Accordingly, and obviously, the situation of Ellis Island is
much different from the situation of the lands under the waters
of the Bay on the New Jersey side of the boundary. The
submerged lands west of the line established by the Compact
are designated as property of New Jersey and thus are subject
to its sovereignty, including the sovereign power of taxation.
The waters above the lands are regulated by New York,
which has exclusive jurisdiction over all that transpires in
those waters. Ellis Island in its entirety is subject only to the
jurisdiction of New York, under a specific provision of the
Compact designed to preserve the status quo ante of New
York jurisdiction.
For more than three centuries, New York as colony and
state has exercised jurisdiction over Ellis Island. The transfer
of title to the government effected little change. After the
transfer, New York continued to regard Ellis Island as
part of the City, County and State of New York, without
objection by the government or the State of New Jersey.
The “present jurisdiction” language only acknowledged that
government ownership carried with it some limited form of
federal jurisdiction. It did not acknowledge any jurisdiction
on the part of New Jersey, which never exercised any
authority or control of any kind with respect to the Island.
See Hill v. Joseph, 205 Misc. 441, 445, 129 N.Y.S.2d 348,
351 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1954) (“[The commissioners] realized that
Bedloe's and Ellis' Islands were ... under Federal jurisdiction
to some extent. The phrase ‘present jurisdiction’, in my
opinion, was used with that situation in mind rather than as
a limitation on the State of New York by the State of New
Jersey.”).

Ellis Island remains a part of New York by acknowledgment
of the government and without objection (except in this
case) by New Jersey. It has been a component of New York
Congressional, State Senate and Assembly districts for more
than one hundred fifty years. As part of New York County,
it lies within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 28
U.S.C. § 112, and of New York's first judicial district, N.Y.
Const. art. VI, § 6; see Rettig v. John E. Moore Co., 90
Misc. 664, 154 N.Y.S. 124 (N.Y.App.Term 1915) (civil suit
for assault committed “upon government property at Ellis
Island”). The government treats the entire area of Ellis Island
as part of Manhattan for census purposes and has assigned
a New York postal zip code to the Island. Those who have
resided on Ellis Island, both before and after the Compact,
have been treated as citizens of New York. In order to avoid
liability in this case, the government asserts *388 for the
first time that certain portions of Ellis Island belong to New
Jersey. However, long acceptance of the status quo counts
for a great deal in matters of territorial disputes between
states. See, e.g., Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376,
110 S.Ct. 2903, 2914, 111 L.Ed.2d 309 (1990); Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 569-71, 60 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-31,
84 L.Ed. 1362 (1940); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295,
306-08, 46 S.Ct. 290, 293-94, 70 L.Ed. 595 (1926); Indiana
v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 511-12, 10 S.Ct. 1051, 1054-55,
34 L.Ed. 329 (1890). We think that it counts for a great deal
here also, even though neither New York nor New Jersey is
a party to the action. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact
that New Jersey lays its territorial claim, not by invoking
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with paragraph 2, section 2, article III of the United States
Constitution, but by filing an amicus brief in this case.
The impracticability of the government's position is apparent
from an examination of the Historical Development Map
attached as an Appendix to this opinion. The landfilled area
surrounds the original Ellis Island on all sides, and the
boundary line between the original portion of the Island and
the portion created by fill is haphazard and uneven. To restrict
the application of New York law to the enclave described
on the Map as “Original Island” and apply New Jersey law
outside the enclave would, in the words of the district court,
“mak[e] it necessary for every person injured on Ellis Island
to engage in litigation to establish the exact spot on the
island where the injury was sustained.” The government notes
that the National Park Service administers many areas that
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are subject to the jurisdiction of one or more states and
gives as examples Assateague Island National Seashore, 16
U.S.C. § 459f, and the Appalachian National Scenic Trail,
16 U.S.C. § 1244(a). There is nothing to indicate, however,
that these national park areas or any others have boundary
line configurations, delineating state jurisdictions, that are as
strange or as difficult to identify as those the government
urges us to recognize here.
Finally, the cases cited by the government in support of its
contention that the Compact gives New Jersey jurisdiction
over the formerly submerged sections of Ellis Island, for
purposes of applying its tort law, give no comfort to its
position in light of our analysis of the Compact. The cases all
deal with jurisdiction and property in regard to harbors and
submerged lands and with the exercise of police powers over
the waters of the bay and river. None pertains to jurisdiction
over the singular territory known as Ellis Island. In State v.
Babcock, 30 N.J.L. 29 (1862), an opinion written by Judge
Lucius Elmer, who had served as one of the Commissioners
appointed to negotiate the Compact, the court held that New
York had jurisdiction to seek the removal of obstructions
to navigation in the Hudson River. Judge Elmer noted that
the Commissioners intended to give police and quarantine
powers over the entire River to New York, with New Jersey
having “exclusive property in the soil to the middle of the
river.” Id. at 33-34.
In People v. Central Railroad, 42 N.Y. 283, writ of error
dismissed, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455, 20 L.Ed. 458 (1870), the
New York Court of Appeals, reviewing the plain language
of the Compact, came to the unexceptional conclusion that
New York had no jurisdiction over the wharves and piers
attached to the New Jersey shore. Neither that case nor
any other case cited by the government interpreting the

Compact deals with jurisdiction over filled-in lands in general
or Ellis Island in particular. See, e.g., Tennant v. State
Board of Taxes, 95 N.J.L. 465, 468-69, 113 A. 254, 255
(1921) (New Jersey could levy personal property tax against
tugboat permanently moored in its waters); Ferguson v. Ross,
126 N.Y. 459, 463, 27 N.E. 954 (1891) (New York could
prosecute for dumping dredged material close to New Jersey
shore); Preisler v. Velasquez, 65 Misc.2d 703, 704-05, 318
N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1971) (New York ordinarily
has no jurisdiction of traffic accident occurring on New Jersey
side of George Washington Bridge); *389 Kowalskie v.
Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1947) (injuries to stevedores unloading vessel
docked on New Jersey shore occurred within New Jersey
boundaries even if claims arose after stevedores jumped into
Hudson River adjacent to pier); In re Gutkowski's Estate, 135
N.J.Eq. 93, 103, 33 A.2d 361, 366 (1943) (estate of child
killed in boating accident on New Jersey side of river should
be distributed according to New Jersey law). The Compact
does not provide for jurisdiction over lands created by fill. It
does provide for jurisdiction over Ellis Island. New York is
the jurisdiction provided.

CONCLUSION
The law of New York is applicable to the claims asserted in
this action. The order of the district court therefore is affirmed
in all respects. The case is remanded to the district court, there
to continue in the regular course.

*390 APPENDIX
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